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ABSTRACT
This paper develops new recursive methods for studying stationary sequential equilibria in games
with private monitoring. We ﬁrst consider games where play has occurred forever into the past and
develop methods for analyzing a large class of stationary strategies, where the main restriction is
that the strategy can be represented as a ﬁnite automaton. For a subset of this class, strategies
which depend only on the players’ signals in the last k periods, these methods allow the construction
of all pure strategy equilibria. We then show that each sequential equilibrium in a game with inﬁnite
histories deﬁnes a correlated equilibrium for a game with a start date and derive simple necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for determining if an arbitrary correlation device yields a correlated equilibrium.
This allows, for games with a start date, the construction of all pure strategy sequential equilibria
in this subclass.
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Reserve System.1. Introduction
In this paper, we propose new recursive methods for studying repeated games with
private monitoring. Our contribution is twofold. We present a model of repeated games with
inﬁnite histories — that is, games in which time extends inﬁnitely backward and forward
— and establish new set-based methods for verifying the equilibrium conditions for a large
class of stationary strategies. For a subset of this class, strategies which depend only on the
players’ signals in the last k periods, these methods allow the construction of all pure strategy
equilibria. We also establish a connection between equilibria of games with inﬁnite histories
and correlated stationary equilibria of traditional games with a start date and derive simple
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for determining if an arbitrary correlation device yields a
correlated equilibrium. This allows, for games with a start date, the construction of all pure
strategy sequential equilibria in this subclass.
Games with inﬁnite histories are interesting in their own right. Our model lets us
abstract away from the inherent non-stationarity of the set of possible histories that plagues
games with a start date. A long tradition in economic theory is to use the repeated game
model to study the dynamic provision of incentives because in the case of perfect or public
monitoring, such models oﬀer a highly tractable stationary environment without end-of-
horizon eﬀects. However, with private monitoring, the stationarity is broken by beginning-
of-horizon eﬀects: the set of possible private histories changes through time and with it the
possibilities to coordinate play among players. Our model of repeated games with inﬁnite
histories solves this problem.
Our formulation is simple. A joint strategy is a mapping from each player’s privately
observed inﬁnite history to how he plays today. An equilibrium strategy is one where eachplayer’s mapping, given what he can infer regarding what his opponents have observed, is a
best response to the other players’ strategies.
We pay particular attention to strategies which can be represented as ﬁnite automata,
that is, where private histories are grouped into a ﬁnite number of private states and a
player’s action depends only on which private state he is in. For this class, we develop
recursive methods on sets of beliefs for each player about the private state of each of his
opponents. The key is that if all players’ strategies are ﬁnite automata, a particular player’s
private history is relevant only to the extent that it gives him information regarding the
private states of his opponents (a point ﬁrst made by Mailath and Morris (2002)). This lets
us summarize a player’s history as a belief over a ﬁnite state space, a much smaller object
(a point also made by Mailath and Morris (2002)). The advantages of working with sets
of beliefs are two. One is that it is necessary and suﬃcient to check incentives only for
those beliefs lying on the boundary of the set of beliefs which can be generated by inﬁnite
histories (Lemma 1). The other advantage of working with sets of beliefs is that these sets
can be readily calculated using recursive methods which look similar to those developed by
Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) but which operate on sets of beliefs rather than sets of
continuation values (Lemma 4).
We also connect our results on games with inﬁnite histories to the more traditional
(and more problematic) formulation of games with a start date. In this part of the paper, we
ﬁrst show that any equilibrium of the game with inﬁnite histories can be used to construct
a correlated equilibrium of the corresponding game with a start date, where the correlation
device sends each player a ﬁctitious private history. We then develop methods for verifying
whether an arbitrary correlation device signaling initial private states, when coupled with
2ﬁnite state equilibrium strategy of the game with inﬁnite histories, forms a correlated equi-
librium. Since sequential equilibria are examples of correlated equilibria (with degenerate
signaling devices), and since strategies which depend only on the signals a player has seen in
the last k periods are ﬁnite state strategies, these methods deliver necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for constructing all k-history dependent pure strategy sequential equilibria.
Finding equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring is known to be diﬃcult.
See, for example, the work of Kandori (2002) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006), Chap. 12.
Among several diﬃculties, a central one is that with private monitoring, the recursive struc-
ture of public monitoring games is lost. The continuation of (sequential) equilibrium play in
a game with private monitoring is not a sequential equilibrium, but rather a correlated equi-
librium in which private histories function as the correlation device. But as Kandori (2002)
notes, the correlation device becomes increasingly more complex over time. By introducing
inﬁnite histories, we make the correlation device stationary and regain some tractability. The
mapping to correlated equilibria of games with a start date is then natural. In fact, using
randomization or exogenous correlation in period 0 of the game to make it more stationary
(and create interior beliefs about the private history of other players) has been suggested by
Sekiguchi (1997), Compte (2002), Ely (2002), and Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (forth-
coming). We present a robust way of applying this method to construct a family of equilibria.
Our results complement the existing literature on the construction of belief-free equi-
libria (for example, the work of Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki (2002), Piccione (2002), Ely, H¨ orner and
Olszewski (2005), and Kandori and Obara (2006)), in which players use mixed strategies and
their best responses are independent of their beliefs about the private histories of their oppo-
nents. In contrast to belief-free equilibria, the equilibria we construct are belief-dependent;
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and Morris (2002), who show robustness of ﬁnite-history dependent strategies in games with
almost-public monitoring (and in Mailath and Morris (2006) show problems with robustness
of inﬁnite-history dependent strategies). Mailath and Morris show that for a strict k-history
dependent equilibrium of a game with public monitoring, if the game is slightly perturbed to
almost-public monitoring, the strategies still form an equilibrium. We can apply our results
to this class of games and calculate exactly how much correlation is necessary. They provide
a suﬃcient bound on the correlation, but leave ﬁnding a necessary and suﬃcient cutoﬀ an
open question.
2. Games with Inﬁnite Histories
Consider a stage game, Γ, with N players, i = 1,...,N, each able to take actions
ai ∈ Ai. Assume that with probability P(y|a), a vector of private signals y = (y1,...,yN)
(each yi ∈ Yi) is observed conditional on the vector of private actions a = (a1,...,aN),
where for all (a,y), P(y|a) > 0 (full support). Further assume that A = A1 × ...AN and
Y = Y1 × ...YN are both ﬁnite sets.
The current period payoﬀ to player i is denoted ui(ai,yi). That is, player i’s payoﬀ is
a function of his own current-period action and private signal. Players put weight 1 − β on
current utility and weight β on future payoﬀs and, as usual, care about the expected value
of utility streams.
We start by considering the case (denoted Γ−∞,∞) in which time is assumed to extend
inﬁnitely both backward and forward. (Histories are inﬁnite.) In Section 5, we connect
our results to the more traditional case where time is assumed to start at date t = 0 and
4extend forward only (denoted Γ0,∞). To this end, let ai denote an inﬁnite history of player i’s
private actions ai = {ai,1,ai,2,...} with the set of possible private action histories ai denoted
by Ai. (All history sequences move backward in time with the time subscript referring to the
number of periods before the present period.) Likewise, let player i’s private signal history be
denoted yi = {yi,1,yi,2,...}, where Yi denotes the set of possible private signal histories for
player i. Finally, let A = A0 × ... × AN, Y = Y0 × ... × YN, Z = A × Y, Zi = Ai × Yi
and Z−i = A−i × Y−i, where the subscript −i refers to the set {1,2,...,i − 1,i + 1,...,N}.
In words, zi ∈ Zi is what player i has directly observed and z−i ∈ Z−i is what player i has
not directly observed, but his opponents have.
For player i, let a mixed strategy σi(ai|zi) : A×Zi → [0,1] map inﬁnite private histories
to the probability of taking a given action. Denote a joint strategy as σ = (σ1,...,σN). This
formulation implicitly restricts strategies to not depend on the calendar date (a concept we
have, in fact, not introduced).
A. Stationarity:
Let π : B(Z) → [0,1] be a probability measure over inﬁnite histories where B(Z)
denotes the Borel subsets of Z. Let G(σ,π) : B(Z) → [0,1] be the probability measure over
inﬁnite histories induced by π and the addition of one more period through the strategy σ












((a,y),z) ∈ ˆ S

dπ(z),
where I is the indicator function. A pair (σ,π) is said to be stationary if G(σ,π) = π.
5B. Beliefs:
With full support all inﬁnite histories occur with zero probability. So to deﬁne condi-
tional beliefs we consider sets of histories.
For sets of inﬁnite histories ˆ Zi ∈ B(Zi) such that π(ˆ Zi × Z−i) > 0, one can deﬁne
player i’s conditional probability measure πi : B(Zi) × B(Z−i) → [0,1] as
πi(ˆ Z−i|ˆ Zi) = π(ˆ Zi × ˆ Z−i)/π(ˆ Zi × Z−i). (1)
This uniquely deﬁnes beliefs π-almost everywhere. However, for sets of inﬁnite histories where
player i has deviated, this formula has no implications since the measure π puts zero measure
on the entire set of inﬁnite private histories which can only be reached through player i’s own
deviation.
In games with a start date and full support, player i’s beliefs can still be uniquely
deﬁned for histories where he has deviated. The full support assumption ensures that player
i will never see evidence that his opponents have deviated (and thus will assume they haven’t).
Beliefs regarding what his opponents have seen after t dates can then be deﬁned for arbitrary
(on or oﬀ path) speciﬁcations of player i’s actions and signals using the strategy σ, the signal
function P, and Bayes’ rule. But this logic does not extend (as far as we can show) to games
with inﬁnite histories where player i has deviated an inﬁnite number of times.
To see this, note that if player i deviated only in the most recent period, one can deﬁne
beliefs conditional on player i’s oﬀ path actions as follows: Let (ai,yi) be an arbitrary action
and signal representing player i’s most recent action and signal and let ˆ Zi be a set of inﬁnite
histories where player i has not deviated, representing his actions and signals for all earlier
periods. In this case, the probability of (a−i,y−i) × ˆ Z−i conditional on (ai,yi) × ˆ Zi can be
6deﬁned as





ˆ ai,ˆ yi(Π−iσ−i(ˆ a−i|z−i))P(yi, ˆ y−i|ai,ˆ a−i)
dπi(z−i|zi).
This logic generalizes to all histories where player i has deviated only a ﬁnite number of
times, and thus there exists a date before which he has not deviated. But this logic does not
generalize to inﬁnite histories where player i has deviated an inﬁnite number of times since
one cannot pin down “initial” beliefs regarding the actions of the other players.
To handle these cases we consider trembling. That is, if σi : A×Zi → (0,1), all actions
by player i are on path and conditional probabilities can be deﬁned as in equation (1). Given
this, we say πi is a valid conditional belief measure if there exists a sequence {(σs,πs,πi,s)}∞
s=0
such that σi,s : A × Zi → (0,1), σs → σ in the sup norm and πs → π and πi,s → πi in the
weak-∗ topology.
C. Equilibrium Deﬁnition













A triplet (σ,π,πi) is a Stationary Sequential Equilibrium of the game with inﬁnite
histories Γ−∞,∞ (SSE-ih) if
1. For all i, z, and ˆ σi : zi → [0,1], Evi(zi|σ) ≥ Evi(zi|(ˆ σi,σ−i)).
2. G(σ,π) = π.
73. For all i, πi is a valid conditional belief measure.
3. Finite State Strategies
This section develops methods for analyzing a particular (but large) class of strategies.
First, we assume that each player’s strategy can be described as a ﬁnite automaton, and
second, that along the path of play information depreciates (an assumption formally made
below). We show how to verify whether or not a particular strategy proﬁle of this type is an
SSE-ih. Given this, we show how to calculate all pure strategy equilibria of an important
subset of these strategies: those which depend only on the last k periods of a player’s history.
Player i’s strategy σi can be described as a ﬁnite automaton if and only if his set of
inﬁnite private histories Zi can be divided into a ﬁnite partition Ωi such that σi does not
distinguish between histories zi and ˆ zi if both histories are in the same cell ωi ∈ Ωi. (That
is, if zi ∈ ωi and ˆ zi ∈ ωi, then σi(ai|(zi,1,...,zi,s),zi) = σi(ai|(zi,1,...,zi,s),ˆ zi) for all ai and
ﬁnite histories (zi,1,...,zi,s).) Let Di denote the number of elements of Ωi and D−i denote
the number of elements of Ω−i, the set of private states for the other players. Instead of
explicitly writing strategies and payoﬀs as functions of histories, we (equivalently) express
them as functions of this induced state space.1
Since a player does not know the aggregate state ω, but instead knows only his own
part of it, ωi, he will use all the information available to him (his private inﬁnite history
zi) to form beliefs regarding ω−i ∈ Ω−i. For a particular inﬁnite private history, a player’s
beliefs over the aggregate state of the game are simply a point in the (D−i − 1)-dimensional
unit-simplex, denoted ∆D−i. Let µi(zi) : Zi → ∆D−i denote player i’s beliefs about ω−i after
1 For a useful discussion of the validity of representing strategies as ﬁnite state automata in the context
of games with private monitoring, see Mailath and Morris (2002) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006).




For a strategy σ and corresponding beliefs πi, information is said to depreciate if for
all  > 0, i, ω−i, and inﬁnite private histories zi, z0
i , and z1
i , there exists an s such that
|µi(ω−i|(zi,1,...,zi,s,z0
i )) − µi(ω−i|(zi,1,...,zi,s,z1
i ))| <  (uniform convergence of beliefs).
This condition can be veriﬁed as follows: Let X(zi) specify the probability of player i’s
opponents transiting from state ω−i last period to state ω−i this period conditional on player i
observing zi today and his opponents following strategy σ. If there exists an s such that for all
(zi,1,...,zi,s), the matrix X(zi,1)...X(zi,s) contains no zeros, then information depreciates.2
This condition is immediately satisﬁed if player i’s strategy σi (for all i) depends
only on the last k periods of yi (as opposed to depending also on his action realizations).
An example of a strategy where information does not depreciate would be if player i plays
whatever action he played in the previous period.
Given a strategy σ and its corresponding state space Ω, we can deﬁne expected payoﬀs








P(y|a)[(1 − β)ui(ai,yi) + βVi(ω
+ (a,y,ω)|σ)]

where ω+ (a,y,ω) is the next-period state given current-period state ω and new (a,y). That
is, Vi(ω|σ) is the expected utility of player i if he knows the aggregate state (including the
private states of the other players) and he and all the other players mechanistically play the
2If player i’s beliefs were µi or ˆ µi s periods ago, beliefs today after (zi,1,...,zi,s) are, respectively,
µiX(zi,s)...X(zi,1) and ˆ µiX(zi,s)...X(zi,1). If the diﬀering beliefs are pushed t periods back in time
and an extra t periods of data are added for dates s + 1 to s + t, player i’s beliefs become, respectively,
µi(X(zi,s+t)...X(zi,s+1))X(zi,s)...X(zi,1) and ˆ µi(X(zi,s+t)...X(zi,s+1))X(zi,s)...X(zi,1). Premultiply-
ing the transition matrix X(zi,s)...X(zi,1) by a matrix with no zeros uniformly decreases the distance
between the rows.
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We have now deﬁned expected payoﬀs as functions of private states ωi and beliefs over the
private states of the other players mi, instead of expected payoﬀs being functions of a player’s
inﬁnite private history zi.
Rather than considering separately the beliefs mi ∈ ∆D−i that a player will have after
some inﬁnite history, it is useful to consider subsets of beliefs. Let M∗
i (ωi) = co({m|m =
µi(zi) for some zi ∈ ωi}) (where co() denotes the closure of the convex hull). Here, M∗
i (ωi) is
the closure of the convex hull of the set of possible beliefs player i can have about ω−i given
that he’s seen zi ∈ ωi, where a belief is possible if there is an inﬁnite private history which
induces this belief. Let M∗
i denote the collection of Di of these subsets, one for each ωi.
The following lemma establishes that to check the incentives of a ﬁnite state strategy,
one need only check that for each player i and private state ωi, the player does not wish to
deviate when his beliefs about the other players’ private states ω−i are on the frontier of the
convex hull of all possible beliefs M∗
i (ωi). That is, it is not necessary to check incentives for
every inﬁnite history.
Lemma 1. Consider a ﬁnite state strategy σ and measures (π,πi) satisfying conditions 2
and 3 of the deﬁnition of an SSE-ih and the implied sets M∗
i (ωi). Then (σ,π,πi) is an
SSE-ih if and only if EVi(ωi(zi),mi|σ) ≥
P
ω−i mi(ω−i)vi(zi,z−i ∈ ω−i|ˆ σi,σ−i) for all i, zi,
ˆ σi : A × Zi → [0,1] and all mi such that mi is on the frontier of M∗
i (ωi).
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EVi(ωi,mi|σ) ≥
P
ω−i mi(ω−i)vi(zi,z−i ∈ ω−i|ˆ σi,σ−i) and EVi(ωi, ˆ mi|σ) ≥
P
ω−i ˆ mi(ω−i)vi(zi,z−i ∈
ω−i|ˆ σi,σ−i) for all i, ωi and ˆ σi : A × Zi → [0,1].) Then since expected utility for any ˆ σi
(including the on-path strategy σi) is linear in these beliefs, for all α ∈ (0,1), incentives
hold for beliefs αmi +(1−α)ˆ mi. Next, every inﬁnite history generates beliefs within M∗
i (ωi)
by construction. Further, holding ωi constant, player i’s history is relevant to him only to
the extent that it aﬀects his beliefs regarding the other players’ continuation play which is
determined by ω−i. Thus if incentives hold for the beliefs generated by inﬁnite history zi,
incentives hold for inﬁnite history zi. Finally, the beliefs generated by any inﬁnite history
can be constructed as the convex combination of points on the frontier of M∗
i (ωi).
Only if: Suppose (σ,π,πi) satisfy condition 1 of the deﬁnition of an SSE-ih, but there
exists a belief mi on the frontier of M∗
i (ωi) and a deviation strategy ˆ σi : A×Zi → [0,1] such
that EVi(ωi,mi|σ) <
P
ω−i mi(ω−i)vi(zi,z−i ∈ ω−i|ˆ σi,σ−i). If mi is the linear combination of
beliefs generated by private histories z0
i ∈ ωi and z1
i ∈ ωi, then this is a contradiction since,
as shown above, if incentives hold for a set of beliefs, they hold for all linear combinations
of those beliefs. But since M∗
i (ωi) is the closure of the convex hull of beliefs generated by
private histories, the only remaining possibility is that mi is within the closure of the convex
hull of beliefs generated by histories, but not the convex hull itself. But if incentives do not
hold for a given belief, then, for a given deviation strategy, the gain to deviation is strictly
positive. This implies deviation is preferred for some neighborhood around this belief as well,
contradicting the supposition.
Lemma 1 is useful for checking whether or not a particular ﬁnite state strategy is an
equilibrium when the sets of beliefs generated by that strategy (for each player i) M∗
i are
11known. In Lemmas 2 through 4, we construct a method for generating, for each ﬁnite state
strategy, the appropriate M∗
i sets.
We begin by constructing an operator from sets of beliefs to sets of beliefs with the
property that the operator’s largest ﬁxed point is M∗
i . Let Mi (without the ∗) denote an
arbitrary collection of Di closed convex subsets of ∆D−i, and let the one-step operator T(Mi)
be deﬁned as follows: First, let F(ωi) be the set of private states last period consistent with
the private state this period being ωi. (That is, F(ωi) = {ωi| there exists zi ∈ ωi and
zi ∈ Ai × Yi such that (zi,zi) ∈ ωi }.) Likewise, let G(ωi,ωi) = {zi = (ai,yi)| if zi ∈ ωi, then
(zi,zi) ∈ ωi}. That is, G(ωi,ωi) is the set of (ai,yi) pairs such that player i’s private state
transits from ωi to ωi. The successor of belief mi ∈ ∆D
−i given new data (ai,yi) (denoted
m0
i(mi,ai,yi) ∈ ∆D











ˆ a−i,ˆ y−i σ−i(ˆ a−i|ω−i)P(yi, ˆ y−i|ai,ˆ a−i)
.
In the above formula, the ratio is the probability of the event (a−i,y−i) conditional on (ai,yi).
This probability is then summed over all (a−i,y−i) realizations consistent with the other
player(s) moving from state ω−i to ω−i, averaged over the probability of the other player(s)
being in state ω−i according to beliefs mi. Then
T(Mi)(ωi) = {mi| there exists ωi ∈ F(ωi),mi ∈ Mi(ωi) and (ai,yi) ∈ G(ωi,ωi)
such that mi = m
0
i(mi,ai,yi)}.
The T operator works as follows: Suppose one takes as given the beliefs of player i over the
private state of the other players, ω−i, last period. Bayes’ rule then implies what player i
12should believe about ω−i this period for each realization of (ai,yi). If there exists a way
to choose player i’s state last period, the beliefs of player i over the private states of his
opponents last period, and a new realization of (ai,yi) such that Bayes’ rule delivers beliefs
mi, then mi ∈ T(Mi)(ωi). In eﬀect, the T operator gives, for a particular collection of belief
sets Mi, the belief sets associated with all possible successor beliefs generated by new data
and interpreted through σ.
Lemmas 2 through 4 show that the T operator can then be used to generate the true
sets of valid beliefs M∗
i . We write Mi ⊂ ˆ Mi if Mi(ωi) ⊂ ˆ Mi(ωi) for all ωi.
Lemma 2. If M∗
i ⊂ Mi , then M∗
i ⊂ T(Mi).
Proof. For a given ωi choose beliefs mi ∈ M∗
i (ωi) such that mi is the linear combination
of beliefs m0
i and m1
i for which there exist inﬁnite histories z0
i and z1
i which generate beliefs
m0
i and m1
i. Now consider these histories except for the last period. That is, let ˆ z0
i =
{z0
i,2,,...} and ˆ z1
i = {z1
i,2,,...}. Beliefs after histories ˆ z0
i and ˆ z1
i (call them ˆ m0





i) and ˆ m1
i ∈ M∗
i (ω1
i), where ˆ z0
i ∈ ω0
i and ˆ z1
i ∈ ω1




i) and ˆ m1
i ∈ Mi(ω1
i) from M∗
i ⊂ Mi, m0
i = m0
i(ˆ m0




i,ai,yi) ∈ T(Mi)(ωi). Since T maps closed convex sets to closed convex sets
(from the linearity of our Bayes’ rule operator in beliefs), mi ∈ T(Mi)(ωi). This leaves only
the possibility that mi ∈ M∗
i (ωi) is not a linear combination of beliefs generated by inﬁnite
histories, which, from the deﬁnition of M∗
i implies mi is on the frontier of M∗
i (ωi). Suppose
then mi / ∈ T(Mi)(ωi). Since the above logic can be applied to a sequence of points in M∗
i (ωi)
converging to mi, each point in this sequence is in T(M∗
i )(ωi), implying T(M∗
i )(ωi) is an open
set, a contradiction.
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i .
Proof. For a given ωi, choose beliefs mi ∈ T(Mi)(ωi). Since mi ∈ T(Mi)(ωi) there exists a
private realization zi = (ai,yi) and beliefs m1
i ∈ Mi(ω1
i) (where ω1
i ∈ F(ωi)) such that mi =
m0(m1
i,ai,yi). That Mi ⊂ T(Mi) ensures that m1
i ∈ T(Mi)(ω1
i), thus this can be repeated
indeﬁnitely, generating any ﬁnite length history of private outcomes {zi,1,...,zi,s} and beliefs
ms
i ∈ Mi(ˆ ω
s
i), with the property that beliefs mi ∈ T(Mi)(ωi) are the beliefs player i would
hold if he started with beliefs ms
i and proceeded to experience private history {zi,1,...,zi,s}.
That information depreciates ensures that beliefs converge to the actual probability of ω−i
conditional on the entire inﬁnite history. Given this, mi ∈ M∗
i (ωi).
Let T s(Mi) denote the application of the T operator s times on Mi and ∆ = (∆D−i)Di
(that is, Mi = ∆ implies for all ωi, all beliefs are acceptable).
Lemma 4. lims→∞ T s(∆) = M∗
i .
Proof. Examination of the T operator shows it to be monotonic in that if Mi ⊂ ˆ Mi, T(Mi) ⊂
T( ˆ Mi). Since T(∆) ⊂ ∆, T 2(∆) ⊂ T(∆) and so on. Thus T s(∆) represents a sequence of
(weakly) ever smaller included sets, guaranteeing that the limit exists. From Lemma 2,
M∗
i ⊂ T(M∗
i ). Lemma 3 then implies T(M∗
i ) ⊂ M∗
i , thus M∗
i = T(M∗
i ). Further, since
M∗
i ⊂ ∆ monotonicity implies T(M∗
i ) = M∗
i ⊂ T(∆) and so on. Thus M∗
i ⊂ lims→∞ T s(∆).
Since lims→∞ T s(∆) = T(lims→∞ T s(∆)), Lemma 3 implies lims→∞ T s(∆) ⊂ M∗
i .
While Lemma 4 shows that M∗
i is the largest ﬁxed point of T (and thus M∗
i can
be computed by successively applying T to ∆) unlike the value sets calculated in Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) we can show that M∗
i is, in fact, the unique ﬁxed point of our
operator if the strategy depends only on the last k periods of the player’s private history
14and information depreciates. However, iterating on ∆ is particularly useful since at every
iteration M∗
i ⊂ T s(∆). Thus, if after s iterations, incentives hold on the boundary of T s(∆)
one need iterate no further in order to verify that σ is an equilibrium.
So far, we have focused on the ﬁnite state strategies σ and left implicit the corre-
sponding measures on inﬁnite histories π and πi. For a given ﬁnite state strategy σ, one can
construct π as follows: Strategy σ and the function P deﬁne a Markov transition matrix X
mapping the aggregate state ω yesterday to the aggregate state ω0 today. That information
depreciates implies that this matrix has a unique ergodic distribution, me(ω). The probability
of an inﬁnite sequence ending in a particular z1 = (a1,y1) is
P
ω me(ω)(Πiσi(ai,1|ωi))P(y1|a1).
The probability of an inﬁnite sequence ending in (z1,z2) (where again the most recent real-
ization is ﬁrst) is
P
ω me(ω)(Πiσi(ai,2|ωi))P(y2|a2)(Πiσi(ai,1|ω0
i(ωi,z2)))P(y1|a1), and so on.
Likewise, the conditional probability measures πi can be calculated using Bayes’ rule similarly
conditioning only on the last s periods, for all s.
Finally, note that the ability to verify whether or not a ﬁnite state strategy σ such
that information depreciates is an SSE-ih (when coupled with the appropriate beliefs π and
πi) allows one to calculate all such pure-strategy k-history dependent SSE-ih for the simple
reason that there exist a ﬁnite number of candidate pure strategies.
4. Two Examples
In this section we construct two simple examples. The ﬁrst is based on Mailath and
Morris (2002). Consider the two player partnership game in which each player i ∈ {1,2} can
take action ai ∈ {C,D} (cooperate or defect) and each can realize a private outcome yi ∈
{G,B} (good or bad). If m players cooperate, then with probability pm(1−)2 +(1−pm)2,
15both players realize the good private outcome. With probability (1 − ), player 1 realizes
the good outcome while player 2 realizes the bad. (Likewise, with this same probability,
player 2 realizes the good outcome and player 1 the bad.) Finally, with probability pm2 +
(1 − pm)(1 − )2, both players realize the bad outcome. Essentially, this game is akin to one
in which pm determines the probability of an unobservable common outcome and  is the
probability that player i’s outcome diﬀers from the common outcome. Thus when  = 0,
outcomes are public, and when  approaches zero, outcomes are almost public. Payoﬀs are
determined by specifying for each player i the vector {ui(C,G),ui(C,B),ui(D,G),ui(D,B)}.
Next consider perhaps the simplest non-trivial pure strategy: tit-for-tat. That is,
let each player i play C if his private outcome was good in the previous period and D
otherwise. This is a two-state strategy with Ωi = {R,P}, for “reward” and “punish.” For
inﬁnite histories ending in yi = G, player i is in state ωi = R (and the strategy calls for
the player to play C) and for all other histories, player i is in state P where he plays D.
Thus, for computation purposes, the set M∗
i (ωi) is simply an interval specifying the range
of probabilities that player −i realized a good outcome last period, given that player i is in
state ωi. The mapping T from Section 3 then maps a collection of two intervals (one for each
ωi) to a collection of two intervals, and the results in that section imply that starting with
the unit interval for each of these and iterating delivers the true intervals M∗
i (R) and M∗
i (P).
For β = 0.9, p0 = 0.3, p1 = 0.55, and p2 = 0.9 and a payoﬀ of 1 for receiving a good
outcome and a payoﬀ of –0.4 for cooperating, we can easily verify that the static game is a
prisoner’s dilemma and that tit-for-tat is an equilibrium of the public outcome ( = 0) game.
For  > 0, beliefs matter and one must construct the intervals M∗
i (ωi). The procedure of
iterating the T mapping (starting with unit intervals) is relatively easily implemented on a
16computer. For  = 0.025 the procedure converges (in less than a second) to these intervals:
M∗
i (R) = [0.923,0.972], and M∗
i (P) = [0.036,0.199]. For each speciﬁcation of ωi, if player i
believes the other player saw a good outcome with a probability within M∗
i (ωi), he wishes to
follow the equilibrium strategy (C if ωi = R, D otherwise); thus tit-for-tat is an equilibrium.
If  is increased to  = 0.03, then the intervals M∗
i (ωi) shift toward the middle and
widen: M∗
i (R) = [0.908,0.966] and M∗
i (P) = [0.043,0.229]. Now, if ωi = R and player i
believes that his opponent is in state R with probability 0.908, he wishes to deviate and play
D rather than C. Thus, with  = 0.03, tit-for-tat is not an equilibrium, since, by construction,
there exists an inﬁnite private history for player i ending in G such that he believes the other
player saw a good outcome last period with probability 0.908 (the lower end of the interval).
Simply put, being only 91 percent sure your opponent saw the same good signal as you
(and thus will cooperate along with you) is an insuﬃcient inducement for cooperation in this
repeated prisoner’s dilemma.
From Mailath and Morris (2002) we know that in this example, for suﬃciently small
, tit-for-tat is an equilibrium, and obviously for suﬃciently high  it is not. Our analysis
of this example allows us to go further: to establish exactly for which epsilons the proﬁle is
an equilibrium. That is, our methods allow us to consider whether any proposed strategy is
an equilibrium strategy, regardless of whether the signals are nearly public. In fact, one can
construct equilibria which depend on the private signals not being nearly public.
Consider a two-player battle of the sexes game where each player i ∈ {1,2} can take
action ai ∈ {Ballet,Hockey} and each can realize a private outcome yi ∈ {G,B} (good or
bad). If both players take the same action, they both realize a good outcome with probability
0.9, both receive a bad outcome with probability 0.08, and player i realizes a good outcome
17while player −i receives a bad outcome with probability 0.01. If the players take diﬀering
actions, they both realize a good outcome with probability 0.05, both receive a bad outcome
with probability 0.05, and player i realizes a good outcome while player −i receives a bad
outcome with probability 0.45. If player 1 realizes a bad outcome, her payoﬀ is zero, and if
she realizes a good outcome, her payoﬀ is 3
2 if she played Ballet and 1 if she played Hockey.
Likewise, if player 2 realizes a bad outcome, his payoﬀ is zero, and if he realizes a good
outcome, his payoﬀ is 3
2 if he played Hockey and 1 if he played Ballet. As in the previous
example, β = 0.9.
Our methods can be used to check if the following simple strategy is an equilibrium:
if a player’s private outcome was good, repeat last period’s play regardless of whether it
was on or oﬀ path. If his (or her) private outcome was bad, switch away from last period’s
play regardless of whether it was on or oﬀ path. This strategy is a two-state automaton
ωi = ([PlayBallet],[PlayHockey]), and belief sets are intervals specifying the probability that
the other player is in state PlayBallet. (This strategy depends on previous actions as well as
signals, but nevertheless, information depreciation is easily veriﬁed.) For these parameters,
the intervals are M∗
i (PlayBallet) = [0.889,0.988] and M∗
i (PlayHockey) = [0.012,0.111], and
incentives hold on the boundaries of these two intervals. But note they hold precisely because
this is not a game with almost public signals. That is, suppose player 1 is in state PlayHockey
and deviates by playing Ballet, while believing (with high probability) that player 2 is in
state PlayHockey. If she realizes a bad outcome, the function P above implies she believes
player 2 most likely received a good outcome (and thus will not switch states), and thus it is
in her interest to follow the equilibrium by playing Hockey next period. If P were such that
she believed player 2 also had a bad outcome, as would be the case if outcomes were almost
18public, after this deviation, player 1 would no longer be willing to follow the strategy.
5. Games with a Start Date
In this section we connect our results in Section 3 for games with inﬁnite histories to
the more traditional class of inﬁnitely repeated games where there exists a start date, t = 0.
We ﬁrst show how to construct, for each SSE-ih, a correlated equilibrium in the corresponding
game with a start date in which the correlation device sends ﬁctitious inﬁnite private histories
to each player. Then, as we did in Section 3, we restrict ourselves to ﬁnite state strategies
where information depreciates and show how, for each ﬁnite state SSE-ih, to construct a
correlated equilibrium in which the correlation device signals an initial state ωi for each player
i, as opposed to signaling inﬁnite private histories. Finally, we develop conditions for checking
whether an arbitrary correlation device which signals starting states, when coupled with a
ﬁnite state strategy σ, is a correlated equilibrium. Since sequential equilibria are examples
of correlated equilibria (with degenerate signaling devices), these methods deliver simple
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for constructing all k-history dependent pure strategy
sequential equilibria of private monitoring games with a start date.
If players receive private signals si ∈ Si at the beginning of the game, a joint strategy
σ is such that σi,t(ai,t|si,(zi,1,...,zi,t)) : A × Si × Zt
i → [0,1], where Zt
i = (Zi)t. Let
vi,t(s,(zi,1,...,zi,t)|σ) be the expected discounted payoﬀ to player i if he knows the joint
signal s, every player’s private history (zj,1,...,zj,t), and he and the other players follow
σ. Let Evi,t(si,(zi,1,...,zi,t)|σ) =
R
s−i vi,t(s,(zi,1,...,zi,t)|σ)dπi,t(si,(zi,1,...,zi,t)), where πi,t
describes player i’s beliefs regarding the signals and histories of the other players given what
he knows at date t. By a correlated equilibrium we mean a joint strategy σ, a signaling device
19or probability measure x : B(S) → [0,1], (where S is the joint signal space), and conditional
probability measures πi,t : B(Si) × Zt
i × B(S−i) × Zt
−i → [0,1] such that
1. Strategies σi are mutual best responses (given beliefs) after all signals and histories.
2. Beliefs, πi, after all signals and histories are consistent with the signaling device x, the
strategy σ, and P.
The next lemma demonstrates that any SSE-ih (σ,π,πi) of Γ−∞,∞ induces a correlated
equilibrium of the game with a start date Γ0,∞, by letting the signal space S be a set of inﬁnite
ﬁctitious histories and having the strategy for the game with a start date combine a player’s
ﬁctitious history signal and his actual history up to date t in such a way that the player
treats his ﬁctitious history as if it were real. That is, if player i receives ﬁctitious history
(ˆ zi,1, ˆ zi,2,...) (with date subscripts going backward in time as in the previous sections), and
then experiences actual history (zi,0,zi,1,...,zi,t) (with date subscripts referring to the calen-
dar date), we let σi,t(ai,t|s = (ˆ zi,1, ˆ zi,2,...),(zi,0,...,zi,t)) = σi(ai,t|(zi,t,...,zi,0, ˆ zi,1, ˆ zi,2,...)).
In eﬀect, through the use of ﬁctitious histories, we have constructed fully stationary strategies
in a game with a start date — a somewhat diﬃcult task since in a game with a start date,
the calendar date is automatically encoded into a player’s history through the length of that
history.
Lemma 5. Take as given an SSE-ih (σ,π,πi) of Γ−∞,∞. For the game with a start date, Γ0,∞,
let S = Z, x = π, and σi,t(ai,t|s = (ˆ zi,1,...),(zi,0,...,zi,t)) = σi(ai,t|(zi,t,...,zi,0, ˆ zi,1,...)).
Then (σ,x,πi) is a correlated equilibrium of Γ0,∞.
Proof. The result immediately follows from (σ,π,πi) being an SSE-ih and that σi,t reacts
to a ﬁctitious history signal, or an actual history with a ﬁctitious history prepended to it, as
20if it were an actual history in Γ−∞,∞ .
While general, Lemma 5 may not be very useful since it relies on a signal space with
a continuum of signals. If σ is a ﬁnite state strategy where information depreciates, Lemmas
6 and 7 below construct correlated equilibria with the signal space S equaling the (ﬁnite) set
of states Ω.
Lemma 6. Take as given a ﬁnite state SSE-ih (σ,π,πi) of Γ−∞,∞ where information depreci-
ates. For the game with a start date, Γ0,∞, there exists a correlated equilibrium with S = Ω
and σi,t(ai,t|ωi,(zi,0,...,zi,t−1)) = σi(ai,t|ω0
i(ωi,zi,1,...,zi,t−1)), where ω0
i(ωi,zi,1,...,zi,t−1)
denotes player i’s private state if he starts in private state ωi and realizes (zi,1,...,zi,t−1).
Proof. Let X denote the probability transition matrix from state ω yesterday to state ω0
today deﬁned by σ and the function P. Since information depreciates, X deﬁnes a unique
ergodic distribution over states ω. If joint signals are drawn from this distribution, beliefs
for each player i must lie within M∗
i since the beliefs of player i regarding ω−i (conditional
on ωi) are a weighted average of player i’s beliefs regarding ω−i when conditioning on his
entire inﬁnite history. By construction, if beliefs over ω−i start within M∗
i , they will always
lie within M∗
i . That (σ,π,πi) is an SSE-ih then ensures that incentives hold at all signals
and histories.
Lemma 6 ensures that every ﬁnite state SSE-ih of Γ−∞,∞ where information depreciates
deﬁnes at least one correlated equilibrium of Γ0,∞. But one still may ask if other correlation
devices may work to permit, say, higher initial values than the correlation device constructed
above. Thus we now turn to developing necessary and suﬃcient conditions for any correlation
device x : Ω → [0,1], when coupled with a ﬁnite state SSE-ih σ, to constitute a correlated
21equilibrium.
Deﬁne ˆ Mi to be set of beliefs such that incentives hold for all beliefs mi ∈ ˆ Mi. Lemma
1 showed that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a ﬁnite state dependent strategy to be
(part of) an SSE-ih is that M∗
i ⊂ ˆ Mi for all i. We need to ensure, however, that incentives
are satisﬁed not only for a particular belief generated by a correlation device, but also for
all possible successors of that belief, and successors of those beliefs, and so on. Recall (from
Section 3) m0
i(mi,ai,yi) ∈ ∆D
−i as the successor beliefs (regarding ω−i) of beliefs mi given new
data (ai,yi). Further recall ω
+
i (ai,yi,ωi) as the next-period private state given current-period
private state ωi and a new (ai,yi). Deﬁne the operator ˆ T(Mi) (mapping sets of beliefs to sets
of beliefs) as






In words, ˆ T eliminates an element of Mi(ωi) if there exists a successor belief which is not in
Mi(ω
+
i ). Clearly, ˆ T is monotonic and ˆ T( ˆ Mi) ⊂ ˆ Mi. Thus {ˆ T s( ˆ Mi)}∞
s=0 represents a sequence
of (weakly) ever smaller included sets, guaranteeing that the limit, denoted M, exists.
Lemma 7. Take as given a ﬁnite state SSE-ih (σ,π,πi) of Γ−∞,∞ where information depre-
ciates. For the game with a start date, Γ0,∞, the strategy σi,t(ai,t|ωi,(zi,0,...,zi,t−1)) =
σi(ai,t|ω0
i(ωi,zi,1,...,zi,t−1)) constitutes a correlated equilibrium when coupled with correla-
tion device x : Ω → [0,1] with implied conditional beliefs πi(ω−i|ωi) =
x(ωi,ω−i)/
P
ω−i x(ωi,ω−i), if and only if πi(ωi) ∈ Mi(ωi) for all i and ωi.
22Proof. If πi(ωi) ∈ Mi(ωi) for all i and ωi, then by the construction of Mi, incentives hold for
all histories. Only if: ˆ Mi is a collection of compact sets because it is deﬁned by weak incentive
compatibility constraints that are linear in beliefs. Second, the ˆ T operator maps compact
sets into compact sets because Bayes’ rule is linear in prior beliefs. Hence, {ˆ T s( ˆ Mi)}∞
s=0 is
a sequence of ever smaller (in the sense of set inclusion) collections of compact sets so the
limit Mi (ωi) is also compact. Now, suppose that πi(ωi) / ∈ Mi (ωi) for some ωi. That implies
that there exists an s such that πi(ωi) / ∈ ˆ T s( ˆ Mi), but that means that there exists a history
of the length s such that player i has a proﬁtable deviation after that history. For example,
if s = 0, then πi(ωi) / ∈ ˆ Mi(ωi) for some ωi, and then incentive compatibility does not hold
at date t = 0 for signal ωi. If s = 1, then πi(ωi) ∈ ˆ Mi(ωi) but πi(ωi) / ∈ ˆ T( ˆ Mi)(ωi) for some
ωi so that incentive compatibility does not hold at date t = 1 for a private signal ωi and a
private history (ai,0,yi,0) at date 0 such that πi(ωi) = m0(πi(ωi),ai,0,yi,0), and so on.
The implications of Lemma 7 for constructing sequential equilibria can be seen by
referring to our ﬁrst example from Section 4. In that example, with  = 0.025, tit-for-tat
is a k = 1-history dependent SSE-ih. That is, incentives hold for the beliefs which can
be generated by inﬁnite histories, M∗
i (R) = [0.923,0.972], M∗
i (P) = [0.036,0.198]. But
incentives hold for wider beliefs than these intervals. For this example, ˆ Mi(R) = [0.704,1]
and ˆ Mi(P) = [0,0.704]. Further, for this example, ˆ T( ˆ M) = ˆ M, thus ˆ M = M. A correlation
device signaling states R and P according to the ergodic distribution of signals G and B
has πi(ω−i = R|ωi = R) = 0.966 and πi(ω−i = R|ωi = P) = 0.085. Since both of these
beliefs are within M(ωi), this signaling device can be used to create a correlated equilibrium
for the tit-for-tat strategy. The point of Lemma 7, however, is that any correlation device
which delivers πi ∈ M can be used as well. In particular, since M(ωi = R) includes the
23belief that ω−i = R with probability 1, putting all probability on ω = (R,R) delivers a
correlated equilibrium. But since this correlation device is degenerate, we have constructed
a sequential equilibrium where both agents cooperate in the ﬁrst period and play tit-for-tat
after that. Likewise, since M(ωi = P) includes ω−i = R with probability 0, we have also
constructed a sequential equilibrium where both agents defect in the ﬁrst period and play
tit-for-tat after that. Finally, since M(ωi = R) does not include the belief that ω−i = R with
probability 0, we have demonstrated that having one player cooperate and the other defect
in the ﬁrst period (and playing tit-for-tat after that) is not a sequential equilibrium. Thus
we have exhaustively determined which starting conditions, when coupled with a particular
SSE-ih, are and are not sequential equilibria.
This logic generalizes. Since the number of pure-strategy k-history dependent strate-
gies where information depreciates is ﬁnite (and we have derived methods for checking whether
each is an SSE-ih) and the number of pure-strategy possibilities for determining play in the
ﬁrst k periods of a game with a start date is also ﬁnite (and we have derived methods for
determining whether each of these starting conditions satisfy incentive compatibility), we
have constructed methods for determining all pure-strategy k-history dependent sequential
equilibria (such that information depreciates) of traditional games with a start date.
6. Concluding Remarks
The equilibria we have characterized here can be used to construct others. For example,
we can construct sequential equilibria for games with a start date in which players mix in the
ﬁrst period and then follow pure stationary strategies conditional on the initial randomization
simply by letting the players draw randomly their private ﬁctitious histories (a construction
24similar to Sekiguchi (1997)). Or, we can also design some other non-stationary strategies in
the ﬁrst few periods and append to it one of our equilibria. Furthermore, once we ﬁnd an
equilibrium for a discount factor β, we can apply Ellison’s (1994) method and construct an
equilibrium for discount factor β
1
2 by simply dividing the game into odd and even periods
and making the players treat these two parts of the game independently. Since incentive
constraints are continuous in β, the sets Mi are too, so ﬁnding a generic equilibrium for one
β provides a neighborhood of equilibria around it. (Recall that the M∗
i sets are independent
of β.)
Some questions remain open. First, we have assumed away any problems associated
with interpreting oﬀ equilibrium behavior by assuming full support of signals. Can our
methods be extended to games without full support? These questions, albeit important, seem
tangential to the stationarity issues we have addressed. Some relaxation of the full support
assumption is possible, for example by the introduction of public signals (that is, making
some realizations of yi perfectly correlated). But the analysis is much more complicated
when some private signals indicate a deviation by another player, and this has not yet been
studied much. Second, we have considered ﬁnite state strategies. It is an open question
how important this restriction is in repeated games with private monitoring. For example,
Cole and Kocherlakota (2005) show that for some games with public monitoring, the set of
payoﬀs achievable with public k-history dependent strategies (an important subset of ﬁnite
state strategies) is strictly smaller than the whole set of PPE payoﬀs (at least for strongly
symmetric strategies). We don’t know how rich the class of games with that property is
and whether the same is true for sequential or correlated equilibria of games with private
monitoring.
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